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either regarded as forces that thwart the general welfare or as sources of
chronic political instability. Thus, the conventional wisdom often focuses
on how to deploy institutional or legal structures that minimize the
influence of faction. By contrast, this Essay argues that the institutions of
constitutional and international law that are forged by self-interested
factions can create significant side benefits for the rest of the society. At
bottom, such institutions are likely to be more durable and energetic than
those created by disinterested or high-minded social designers. Thus, rather
than focus on trying to curtail the influence of faction in shaping political
institutions, it may make more sense to broaden the scope of such influence
to be as inclusive as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
A bedrock assumption of democratic theorizing is that if one wants
good and enduring constitutional and international institutions, one ought
to suppress as much as possible the influence of self-interested factions.1
This Essay suggests a contrary view. Take away the role of self-interested
factions in institutional design and you risk being left with institutions that
are unstable, weak, and lacking in energy. Across a wide swath of issue
areas, from international trade to war powers, factions have played a
beneficial role in designing and shaping relevant political institutions. At its
core, this Essay argues that at least in some critical respects, we may want
to encourage a greater—not lesser—role for self-interested factions in the
design and maintenance of framework institutions of constitutional and
international law.
In many ways, the role assigned to factions in this account is rooted in
a reverse Madisonian logic. According to Madison, our structure of
separation of powers acts to diminish the role of factions by fueling
institutional competition between the political branches in which “ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.” 2 By contrast, in the framework
espoused here, institutional actors do not operate as a countervailing force
against the influence of factions. Instead of being harnessed by other
institutional actors, powerful factions will attempt to co-opt these diverse
institutional actors to serve their narrow policy and electoral ambitions. But

1
I use the terms “factions” and “special interest groups” interchangeably throughout this Essay.
For a review of the literature on how constitutions may constrain rent seeking by interest groups, see
Daniel Sutter, Constitutional Politics Within the Interest-Group Model, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 127
(1995); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50
(1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984). The seminal work on this issue includes GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE
REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985).
2
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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here is the catch: those self-interested ambitions will often, though not
always, overlap with what is socially beneficial for other groups in society.
Overall, the thrust of this Essay’s argument is that we should view the
private benefits that factions extract from pushing their preferred
institutional arrangements as socially desirable. The possibility of obtaining
private benefits may spur factions to create and maintain valuable political
institutions. To be sure, sometimes the role of factional self-interest in
institutional politics can become excessive and counterproductive. The
solution should not be, however, to weaken or diminish the influence of
factions, but instead to control their undesirable excesses through measures
that discourage corruption and arbitrary governance. But having a system
where rules are generally enforced “by the book” among major factions
does not entail that those rules always have to be fair to all groups in
society or enhance the general welfare. Indeed, in many instances, the rules
may be skewed in favor of certain groups. This will often prove sufficient
for long-term political stability, even if certain factions are favored,
provided that the rules do not threaten the interests of the most powerful
factions.
The analysis here implies that the preoccupation with overcoming or
managing faction has obscured a more fruitful approach to institutional
design in constitutional and international law. There is no need to accept
the notion that for constitutional democracy to flourish one needs efficient
institutions that promote the interests of the majority of voters at the
expense of narrow or minority factions. Similarly, international legal
institutions need not produce outcomes that consistently advance the
general welfare to be politically sustainable and enjoy widespread
acceptance. From a normative perspective, what matters is not promoting
the general welfare or weakening factions per se. It is instead to further
some goals of institutions that may occasionally overlap with efficiency but
albeit in an imperfect and somewhat unpredictable manner. One of those
key goals includes institutional stability, and the route to that goal may
often require that we accommodate the interests of powerful factions in a
pragmatic and fair manner, and not oppose them. Indeed, a greater threat to
democracy may arise when institutions evolve to threaten the fundamental
preferences and interests of powerful political factions, especially when
such institutions are perceived to produce policy effects that
disproportionately benefit one side at the expense of another.
Framed differently, the logic underpinning stable political institutions
is not that they are structures that provide for general welfare; but instead,
to borrow a phrase from Hirschman, they are structures of power that
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reflect a compromise among warring factions who “recognize their mutual
inability to achieve dominance.” 3
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the fear of
faction in debates in the institutional design literature. Even when theorists
acknowledge that purging the influence of self-interested factions in
institutional design will not always be feasible, it is often upheld as a
regulative ideal to which institutional framers should aspire.
Part II quibbles with the logic underpinning this assumption. It argues
that, under the right conditions, self-interested factions do and should play
a role in institutional design in both constitutional and international law.
First, and most importantly, factions can help overcome some of the
collective action problems that are likely to plague both the choice and
maintenance of political institutions. Second, factions may invest
significant resources in trying to promote the kinds of institutional
arrangements under which they will likely secure private benefits. In doing
so, they will often embrace institutional features that create spillover
benefits for other unorganized groups. Thus, at the level of institutional
choice, the crucial dynamic is not the one Mancur Olson feared—organized
minority groups exploiting the unorganized majority—but rather,
unorganized and passive groups and individuals free-riding off the efforts
and investments of organized factions.4 Third, factions are likely to act as a
countervailing force against the centralizing and collusive tendencies of
power holders located in the various political branches and in international
institutions. These benefits are illustrated through intense factional conflicts
in United States history surrounding efforts to revise the constitutional
structures that govern international trade and the allocation of war powers.
This Part concludes by recognizing that while the focus of the paper has
been on the upside of factions on institutional design, it is also the case that
sometimes the influence of factions may not always be beneficial. In other
words, there will often be tradeoffs between the energy and resources that
factions may bring to the design of political institutions and the risks of
corruption or wholesale capture of institutions by factions. But this Essay
emphasizes the benign side of the tradeoff because it is one largely
overlooked in much of the public law literature.
This Essay then concludes.

3

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 168
(1991).
4
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 53 (1971).
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I.

THE FEAR OF FACTION

Much of public law discourse is obsessed with overcoming faction.
Indeed, disquiet about the role and undue influence of political factions is
as old as the American Republic itself. 5 But while constitutional and
democratic theory has been historically preoccupied with the dangers of
majority factions, 6 today’s theorists are more likely to be concerned about
the influence of well-organized minority factions that supposedly run
roughshod over the interests of the majority. Simply put, the feared specter
of modern democracy is no longer that mass publics will impose their will
on discrete minorities, but that minorities with concentrated interests will
oppress majorities with diffuse interests. Mancur Olson undercut the
optimistic vision of the pluralists of an earlier era who assumed that
competition among interest groups would produce a desirable confluence
of the preferences of all groups in society. 7 Indeed, much of modern public
choice theory emphasizes the disproportionate power that narrow groups
exercise over public policy. For the most part, theorists assume that the
power of minority groups will be deployed for counterproductive purposes.
Constitutional and democratic theorists, who denounce the corrosive
effects of narrow factions, are quick to point to a solution: fixing our
constitutional structure and international institutions. 8 And in an ironic
twist of events, almost all the institutional actors that were originally
supposed to check the tyranny of the majority are now being elicited to stop
5

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55–56 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., New York,
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889) (“To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great
object to which our inquiries are directed.”).
6
See id. at 55 (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . .
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens.”); see also JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 2 (1985) (“Madison’s analysis
in [The Federalist’s] essay No. 10 remains the foundation of American political theory on interest
groups.”).
7
See OLSON, supra note 4, at 53. For seminal examples of the optimist vision of the pluralist
approach to factions, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23–24 (1967), and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (2d ed. 1971).
8
The seminal account of using institutional design to correct the pathologies of public choice is
from Brennan and Buchanan. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 2 (“If rules influence
outcomes and if some outcomes are ‘better’ than others, it follows that to the extent that rules can be
chosen, the study and analysis of comparative rules and institutions become proper objects of our
attention.”). One version of this approach assumes that an institutional arrangement that has buy-in
from a supermajority will best serve the general welfare. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 1–3 (2013) (arguing that interpreting the
Constitution according to the original intent will be welfare-improving because it received the assent of
a supermajority); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 23 (2010) (proposing institutional reforms that would help
avoid capture of agencies by interest groups).
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the onslaught of narrow minorities. Thus, independent courts, once
heralded as beacons of hope for minority groups and the disenfranchised,9
are being repackaged as institutional actors that can defend enfranchised
majorities against the threat of special interests.10 Presidents, once
considered aloof and removed from populist sentiments, are now venerated
as a bulwark against the parochial factions that dominate the “broken
branch” of Congress. 11 Even independent bureaucrats—those faceless
enemies of populism—have been enlisted in the cause to check the dangers
of narrow factions. 12 Finally, international law, often chastised for its
democratic deficit, 13 has also been brought into this picture. As one
commentator argued in the context of international trade agreements,
“[G]overnments risk to become prisoners of the ‘sirene-like’ pressures of
organized interest groups unless they follow the wisdom of Ulysses . . . and
tie their hands to the mast of international guarantees . . . .” 14
9
See Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving
Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565, 1624 (2013) (“Minorities considered
politically marginalized in the Vinson and Warren Courts era and equal partners in the political process
in the Burger Court era came to be perceived as having too much political power in the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts era.”).
10
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 375 (2009) (“The [Supreme] Court has to
be attuned to aroused public opinion because it is the public that can save a Court in trouble with
political leaders and likewise can motivate political leaders against it.”); Alon Cohen, Independent
Judicial Review: A Blessing in Disguise, 37 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 209 (2014) (arguing that judicial
review dissipates the power of special interest groups); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L REV.
223, 267–68 (1986) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 86 (1985) (same). But cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (arguing that “an independent
judiciary facilitates rather than, as conventionally believed, limits the practice of interest-group
politics”). Other scholars have questioned whether there is any clear relationship between judicial
independence and general welfare. See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social
Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. 575, 609 (2014).
11
See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 1217, 1226–30 (2006) (summarizing this view in the legal literature). For a more sanguine view
of executive power as a check on congressional susceptibility to faction, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995).
12
See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (“[H]aving administrative agencies set government policy
provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for deliberative decisionmaking
informed by the values of the entire polity.”).
13
See JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 10–21 (1998) (emphasizing the need for
stronger constitutional safeguards in the creation of international commitments); John O. McGinnis &
Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1233–46 (2007)
(discussing the democratic deficit of certain kinds of international law, including customary
international law).
14
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 1994
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 166 (1995); see also
John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 511, 528–30 (2000) (describing the logic of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as benefitting
all countries at the expense of special interest groups).
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Many of these prescriptions appear to exploit certain realist aspects of
political life, such as the belief that one can mobilize vice (or political selfinterest) in the service of virtue.15 In these models, however, the civilizing
source of self-interested political behavior tends to run largely in one
direction. In other words, the self-interests of power holders will tame the
self-interests of factions, and not the other way around. 16 Avarice or greed
are the interests that presumably need to be checked, and an office holder’s
quest for honor, prestige, and power does the checking. 17 Of course, powerseekers could check each other, such as when the courts and Congress are
presumed to check the President. 18 But the literature rarely considers the
possibility that factions may in turn play a role in checking the excessive
ambitions of office holders.19 At the most basic level, factions have become
the undesired orphans of institutional design.
15

One illustration of such an invisible hand argument is James Madison’s famous claim in The
Federalist No. 51 that separation of powers will make “[a]mbition . . . counteract ambition.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 349 (James Madison). Madison’s argument has long been
criticized for its opaqueness and lack of clarity. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches
in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2001).
16
A radical expression of the view that the pursuit of honor and ambition would ameliorate the
habits of greed is put forth by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 72. In his defense of allowing the
President more than one term in office, for instance, he argues:
[I]f he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice his
appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of approaching an
inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity,
or his ambition.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 5, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton).
17
Indeed, the political theorist, E. E. Schattschneider, thought that parties could serve to allay the
pernicious influence of factions for this very reason. See E. E. Schattschneider, Pressure Groups Versus
Political Parties, 259 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17, 17 (1948). For parties, he argued,
“[t]he object is . . . to exercise the total power to govern and to assume general responsibility for the
conduct of public business.” Id. Special interests, on the other hand, “do not attempt to get power by
winning elections and are exempted, therefore, from the compulsions which determine the nature of
party organization.” Id.
18
Indeed, there is a vast contemporary literature on institutional reform that continues to rely on
harnessing the self-interests of power seekers, such as courts or Congress, to correct excessive
ambitions of other office seekers such as the President. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 185–207
(1990) (suggesting elaborate legislative proposals to give Congress more bite in war powers). In
addition to constitutionally recognized institutional players, some have also included a role for powerseeking political parties or even broader constraints in the international system as a counteracting agent
on other power seekers. See Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law,
49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 51–53 (2013) (advocating the consideration of external constraints on the
President’s foreign affairs authority); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2330–47 (2006) (parties as counterweight). But policy-seeking
factions continue to be accorded little or no role.
19
Ironically, this view is a complete inversion of the vision associated with Hobbes and other
eighteenth century political theorists. For such theorists, it was the pursuit of honor and dignity that was
considered more damaging to the public order, and he believed the more mundane passions would serve
to counteract them. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 31 (1977).
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Here is the rub: If political actors are susceptible to the influence of
narrow factions during times of normal politics, how can we be sure they
will not fall prey to the same forces when they are designing the institutions
that establish the political rules of the game? After all, if political structures
influence policy outcomes, then surely the same factions will seek to shape
such political structures.20 Indeed, Jack Knight has suggested that political
institutions are often “not best explained as a Pareto-superior response to
collective goals or benefits but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts over
distributional gains.” 21
But even as theorists acknowledge that purging the influence of selfinterested factions in institutional design will not always be feasible, 22 it is
often upheld as a regulative ideal to which institutional framers should
aspire. Jon Elster has argued, for instance, that while there is no sure
institutional path to the general welfare at the expense of faction,
“constituent assemblies ought as far as possible to remove from their
agenda issues on which interest has a purchase.” 23 Otherwise, there is a risk
that self-interested actors will exploit the occasion of institutional design to
entrench themselves in power or lock in their preferred policy objectives.
Against this view, some have argued that self-interested factions can
provide the energy and motivation required to push through crucial
policies. 24 This Essay embraces this traditional justification for faction

20

There is a growing literature on the contingency of political institutions. William H. Riker,
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 432, 444–45 (1980) (“[I]nstitutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the product of
social decisions.”); see also Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 261 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell
eds., 2010) (discussing the role of power and self-interest in shaping institutions); Terry M. Moe, Power
and Political Institutions, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 215 (2005) (same); Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization:
International Law as an Extension of Domestic Political Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 658–82
(2011) (same).
21
JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 19 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
22
Although if factions resist having their interests or preferences ignored in institutional reform,
then one runs into the problem in which the proposed reform runs contrary to the preferences of the
likely reform agent. See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 636–40 (2006) (discussing this problem in institutional reform proposals).
23
JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 235 (2013)
(emphasis omitted). Other commentators have also expressed skepticism about the relationship between
general welfare and institutional design. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE
CONSTITUTION 77 (2011) (“[T]here is no general welfarist argument for the separation of powers or
checks and balances.”).
24
Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 402 (2001)
(“Veil rules not only dampen both information and bias; they also suppress decisionmakers’ activity.
Removing the spur of self-interest threatens to reduce decisionmakers’ activity below acceptable levels,
to the point where constitutional designers might plausibly prefer to lift the veil and spur more activity,
even if the price is that some fraction of that increased activity is self-regarding.”). For a broader
defense of the role of social conflict by pressure groups in advancing democracy, see MARTIN H.
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during times of ordinary politics, but expands upon it by showing that it
can also be supported by other normatively attractive justifications, even
when the ostensible goal is designing framework institutions in
constitutional and international law and not simply policymaking.
II. FACTIONS MAY BENEFIT INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
When factions help shape political institutions, they can perform the
following key functions: overcome collective action problems in the choice
of institutions, create spillover benefits for unorganized groups, and help
constrain the self-interested behavior of individual office holders.
A. Overcoming Collective Action Problems
The overarching point is a somewhat familiar one: Political
institutions (such as those that empower and constrain public officials in
constitutional or international law) are like any other sort of public good,
and because of free-riding problems, there is a risk that they can be
underproduced. After all, citizens will benefit from such institutions
regardless as to whether they contribute towards establishing them in the
first place. So they may likely shirk in contributing their fair share of
energy and resources towards institutional design. But this free-riding
tendency by citizens can thwart the provision of beneficial public
institutions. In this scenario, we might be better off delegating some of the
responsibility for both designing and maintaining political institutions to
those who clearly have the motivation and resources to do so effectively,
i.e., self-interested factions. Such factions may not only supply the relevant
energy and resources for ushering their favored institutions through the
political process, they also have incentives to alert the public and
politicians of the costs and benefits of any institutional alternatives being
considered.
The force of this argument has been recognized in other contexts.
Cowen et al. invoke it in explaining how groups seeking rents may further
beneficial policy outcomes when officials are otherwise not sufficiently
motivated. 25 They argue, “Such institutions as pork-barrel politics can
offset the selfishness of public sector participants, because they reward

REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–10 (2013).
25
Tyler Cowen et al., Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of Public Goods, 6 ECON. & POL.
131, 140–41 (1994). There is also a significant political economy literature that suggests that interest
groups competition can enhance the quality of public information. See David Austen-Smith & John R.
Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25, 28 (1994); Richard Ball, Interest Groups,
Influence and Welfare, 7 ECON. & POL. 119 (1995).
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political effort.” 26 Arguably, the self-interest of factions has even played an
analogous role in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 27
appealed to it explicitly in discussing the possible benefits of patronage
hiring by state governments:
Party strength requires the efforts of the rank and file, especially in “the dull
periods between elections,” to perform such tasks as organizing precincts,
registering new voters, and providing constituent services. Even the most
enthusiastic supporter of a party’s program will shrink before such drudgery,
and it is folly to think that ideological conviction alone will motivate
sufficient numbers to keep the party going through the off years. “For the
most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward generates a
major portion of the local political activity supporting parties.” 28

One might argue that this analogy ought not to be extended to the
choice of political institutions. With their overtones of exploitation and
shortsightedness, factions hardly seem the ideal candidates for shouldering
the burden of framing the political rules of the game that govern society.
But there is another side to the story. Suppose some business group,
seeking to extend the reach of foreign markets for its products, succeeds in
pressing for a more open international trading regime? The consumers who
benefit from the lower tariffs in such a free trade regime are not likely to
fret much even if they were not consulted in its creation. Or suppose that
some other faction, wary of being disproportionately burdened by high
taxes for foreign military adventures, decides to support stronger
constraints on war powers? If such constraints happen to block high-risk
and dangerous military engagements, then we may prefer to retain them.
What if in both instances the factions succeed in locking in their preferred
institutional preferences without significant popular input? In either case it
might be imprudent to reverse course simply because the relevant
institutional choice was tainted by power and self-interest. Put differently,
the implication of factional self-interest in institutional design need not
involve a zero-sum dynamic; on the contrary, it might produce a reasonably
decent state of affairs. 29
26

See Cowen et al., supra note 25, at 142.
497 U.S. 62, 104 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Admittedly, Justice Scalia is referring to
patronage benefits of political parties and not factions, but the broader point is that he alludes to the
benefits the self-interests of groups create as a stabilizing force in modern political life. See id.
28
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 385 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
29
Indeed, the fact of the matter is that in a whole range of circumstances the quest for private
benefits can be congruent with public goods. For instance, when a middle-class family seeks increased
investments in their local public school, they may simply be motivated to further their own children’s
lifetime opportunities. Nonetheless, they may help produce a social benefit in the form of a more
educated citizenry that inures to other members of society.
27
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In the immediate post-Civil War period, for instance, northern
Republican factions in the United States deployed their temporary and
outsized political leverage to impose their institutional vision on the rest of
the country. The end result—an almost complete restructuring of the
previous constitutional order in favor of formerly disenfranchised AfricanAmericans—was accomplished without any input from a significant part of
the country: the defeated South. As Tom Colby stated in a recent piece:
The Fourteenth Amendment was a purely partisan measure . . . . [I]t would
never have made it through Congress had all of the elected Senators and
Representatives been permitted to vote. . . . [I]t was ratified not by the
collective assent of the American people, but rather at gunpoint. 30

One may tend to think of the Reconstruction Amendments as historical
anomalies, but there are a whole host of new institutional regimes that we
merely accept because they happen to be.31 If such newly created regimes
happen to suit our present needs, or at least do not actively undermine
them, we may be content to let them persist.
1. What of the Role of Popular Endorsement?.—Perhaps we care not
only about whether a good institutional outcome happened to be chosen,
but also whether a broad-based majority chose it for the right reasons. But
why should we think that an unorganized majority would be motivated to
mobilize and seek institutional change in the first place? Indeed, building
on Olson’s insight about group size, one might argue that an institutional
interest that is so broad that it covers every segment of society would be
one too diffuse to mobilize. 32 And while justifications of institutions that
are rooted in social contract theories may continue to have some sway in
popular discourse, they nonetheless remain unconvincing. It is very
difficult, if not improbable, that individuals can come together and create
an entire political order from agreement. As Hardin put it, “In a large
society, we cannot simply see that we need government and then conclude
by creating it. Self-love may block you and me from acting jointly with all
our potential fellow citizens.” 33 Of course, once institutional reform is put
on the agenda, the voters (or their representatives) may vote up or down as
to whether to adopt it either in a referendum or representative assembly, but
the contours of such reform are likely to be shaped by others with more
skin in the game.
30
Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013).
31
For illustrations of other such institutions, see infra Part II.A.2–B.
32
See OLSON, supra note 4, at 53–55.
33
Russell Hardin, From Power to Order, From Hobbes to Hume, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 69, 71 (1993).
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Moreover, even when institutions are put in place with the best of
intentions, they are susceptible to atrophy and neglect if they lack powerful
constituencies willing to nourish them. 34 For instance, Kindleberger argued,
about the postwar global institutions, that the patronage of powerful states
was indispensable to their survival. 35 In the early days of the IMF, he
observed, “[I]f the United States made no proposal, nothing happened.” 36
Another illustration of this dynamic comes from Kenya, where a welldesigned system for registering property eventually collapsed because the
commercial interests that used to patronize it no longer found it useful. 37 In
that case, it was not that the registry no longer served a socially useful
function, but that the special interest groups that normally invested
resources in keeping it afloat lost the will to do so.38 And beyond collective
action concerns, there are constraints on the ability of citizens to know
which political institutions best serve their interests. Compared to policies,
for instance, the benefits attainable by alternative political institutions, such
as bicameralism, federalism, delegation to international institutions, or the
separation of powers, are likely to be even more opaque and hard to
understand to ordinary citizens.39
To summarize, at the level of the choice of institutions, interests likely
matter more than high-minded ideals. But will the institutional options
favored by powerful factions come necessarily at the expense of every
other group and produce socially wasteful outcomes? Or do collective
action problems suggest that political institutions might be undersupplied,
and hence the role of self-interested factions might help offset this
deficiency? Because there is no widely agreed upon benchmark of an
optimal level of political institutions, it is hard to answer these questions in
any precise and definitive manner. The bigger challenge is to find an
intermediate position between wholesale institutional cooption by factions
and complete policy autonomy by institutional actors.

34
See Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods Without International Government,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1986).
35
See id.
36
Id.
37
See Ato Kwamena Onoma, The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of
Land Documentation in Kenya, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND
POWER 63 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010).
38
See id. at 63–67.
39
See William H. Riker, Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It
Matter?, 2 COMP. POL. 135, 135–36 (1969) (discussing the gulf between the robust scholarly debates
about federalism and relative public indifference).
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In what follows, I will merely try to establish the plausibility that selfinterest can be a benign force for overcoming free riding problems by using
an illustration from the founding era.
2. An Illustration from the Philadelphia Convention.—Historically,
efforts at centralizing political authority have sometimes been undertaken
by factions with an eye towards reducing political transaction costs.40
Under the rubric of saving costs, one might include not only the relative
ease of concluding political bargains that facilitate commerce across many
jurisdictions, but also the need to present a common front in foreign
commercial policy.
Bawn et al. have portrayed the Federalists that dominated the
Philadelphia Convention agenda in 1787 as a strong and cohesive coalition
composed primarily of southern planters and northern mercantilists. 41 By
demolishing the old order under the Articles of Confederation, these two
factions were able to collude and set in place a structure that reduced the
uncertainty and economic dislocation that resulted from having multiple
states trying to regulate and tax cross border transactions. 42 This new
political order was, in Hardin’s words, designed “to increase the scale of
the market in which entrepreneurs, farmers, and plantation owners in the
states could trade.” 43 To be sure, this arrangement did not benefit those
factions that were not powerful enough to register their preferences in this
grand bargain. As Hardin observes, “it wrecked the hopes of the AntiFederalist vision of small communities and independent farmers” in full
control of their lives and their destinies.44 If so, then one has an instance of
a factional initiative masquerading as populist democratic reform.
The irony of the Convention is that its success required a political
logic that flew in the face of Madison’s prescription in Federalist 10. 45 It

40
See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 96 (1999)
(“The point [of the 1787 Convention] was not to bargain for any trade in particular but to ease the way
to such bargains by eliminating the wasteful transaction costs entailed in interstate tariffs.”).
41
Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations
in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 579–80 (2012).
42
But cf. Robert A. McGuire & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political
Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution, 19 AMER. ECON. REV. 219, 232
(1989) (suggesting northern merchants were in general more likely to support the ratification of the
Constitution, while southern slave owners were less likely to support ratification).
43
HARDIN, supra note 40, at 95.
44
Russell Hardin, Constitutional Economic Transition, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND
DEMOCRATIC RULE 333 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001).
45
Madison had argued that an extended republic would better restrain the power of large factions
because it would make it harder for them to consolidate their strength. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
supra note 5, at 58 (James Madison) (”[T]he greater number of citizens and extent of territory which
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required a national faction that was large and cohesive enough that it could
foist its political will on others.46 But does that mean that this coalition
made a choice that was bad for social welfare or harmful to other groups?
Or was the coalition acting more like a dominant corporation that leverages
its market power to impose industry-wide product standards, which then
benefit other corporations as well? Alternatively, if one prefers the parlance
of the realist school of international relations, was it acting like a global
hegemon providing an international public good even when the hegemon’s
motivations might be ostensibly selfish? 47 After all, given the divide and
rule policies of the United States’ main trading partners in Europe during
the post-Revolution Era, it would seem that having a common tariff policy
would have provided the young country much needed leverage if it wanted
to negotiate favorable commercial terms.
And to have a common tariff, it helps a great deal if one has a central
authority that can establish and coordinate tariff policy. But this latter
innovation does not imply that such a central authority will choose a
socially beneficial tariff; on the contrary, it simply means that if and when
a sufficiently powerful enough coalition emerges and wins office, the
central authority can impose that coalition’s preferred tariffs.
But the challenge with any form of institutional innovation is that it
may unintentionally create or exacerbate other social conflicts down the
road. And the Philadelphia experiment was no exception. For instance, as
early as 1841, the German economist Friedrich List contended that a
primary impetus for the Philadelphia Convention was an effort to protect
American industry from the postwar flood of cheap English goods. 48 But
when, under the new Constitution, tariffs were eventually slashed in 1816,
List accused Congress of being “[c]oerced . . . by powerful private interests

may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government . . . renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter.”).
46
Hardin justifies the stability of the post-Philadelphia constitutional order in similar terms: “[T]he
US constitutional order may have come to work in part because one party gained hegemony for several
decades. It might not have mattered very much whether the Hamiltonians or the Jeffersonians gained
such hegemony. But it might have mattered whether neither had gained it . . . .” HARDIN, supra note 40,
at 239.
47
The proponents of hegemonic stability theory argue that a dominant country that gains
disproportionately from an open market will have an incentive to secure and guarantee it for every other
state. See, e.g., Kindleberger, supra note 34, at 8–9 (discussing how powerful states provide
international public goods); see also Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International
Trade, 18 WORLD POL. 317, 322–23 (1976) (arguing that a “hegemonic state will have a preference for
an open structure” because openness “increases its aggregate national income” and “increases its
political power”).
48
FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 77–79 (Sampson S. Lloyd
trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1909) (1841).
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which were opposed to those of the manufacturers.” 49 Because of the new
low tariffs, he argued, “[The United States] suffered, for a second time,
greater evils through peace than the most devastating war could have
brought upon it.” 50 List’s ruminations illuminate the extent to which
antifaction rhetoric has been deployed in pursuit of a wide range of
purposes in American history. In this case, List used it to impugn the
motives of groups seeking free trade. But that does not imply that the
protectionist motivations he ascribed to the framing generation were
without foundation. Indeed, he himself points to concrete instances where
such sentiments were expressed during that period.51
List’s musings foreshadowed a new fault line of social conflict. The
apparent consensus over the need to centralize tariff-making authority in
1787 proved to be somewhat temporary. Sharp disagreements about the
scope of tariff-making authority erupted during the antebellum era. 52 At the
heart of these disagreements was a rupture between the two dominant
groups that constituted the long coalition in Philadelphia: Southern farmers
and Northern mercantilists. Northern mercantilists embraced the view that
a tariff could be used to protect infant industries, but export-oriented
Southern farmers vehemently opposed this interpretation and thought it
could only be used for revenue purposes.53 When the infamous Tariffs of
Abomination passed in 1828, it eventually spurred the South Carolina
Nullification Crisis of 1832. 54
The institutional politics of the Nullification Crisis defy the
conventional wisdom about the relationship between constitutional
structure and social welfare. The customary wisdom suggests that
institutional structures that encompass bigger geographical entities will be
less prone to protectionism than local or more decentralized structures.55
49

Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
51
Id. at 79.
52
See JONATHAN J. PINCUS, PRESSURE GROUPS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM TARIFFS 15–47
(1977); BRIAN D. SCHOEN, THE FRAGILE FABRIC OF UNION: COTTON, FEDERAL POLITICS, AND THE
GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR 100–26 (2009).
53
See SCHOEN, supra note 52, at 140–41 (describing the view of many delegates from the Lower
South during the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention of 1831 that the protective tariffs were
unconstitutional); see also WILLIAM S. BELKO, THE TRIUMPH OF THE ANTEBELLUM FREE TRADE
MOVEMENT 32–34 (2012).
54
For a background of this controversy and how it helped set the stage for the civil war, see
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1816–1836 (1966).
55
See, e.g., I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 32–33, 205–06 (4th ed. 2005) (observing
that presidents favored low tariffs because the President’s constituency is national while that of a
member of Congress is local); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 155–57 (2009) (same);
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE
50
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But for John C. Calhoun, the intellectual architect of nullification, it was
the preferences of local jurisdictions in the South that would safeguard free
trade against the rampant and welfare destroying protectionism of the
central government. 56 Calhoun further understood that courts might not
have the capacity or will to distinguish between a constitutionally
permissible revenue tariff and an impermissible protective one, 57 but that
export-oriented states like South Carolina—states that were harmed by the
protectionist tariffs—would. 58
The memory of this calamitous event might explain why the framers
of the Confederacy rejected the 1787 Constitution as a model for their own
legislature’s tariff powers. Notably, Article I, Section 8 of the Confederate
Constitution included this important qualification: “[N]or shall any duties
or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster
any branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
uniform throughout the Confederate States.” 59
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 exemplifies an instance where
disagreement about narrow economic interests was strategically elevated to
a fundamental contest over the identity and honor of a region. The export
value of cotton grew dramatically during the decades before the crisis, and
thus the divergence of commercial interests between the agrarian South and
the industrial Northeast was magnified. 60 Both sides took a principled stand
in excess of what was at stake in the controversy, namely the reduction or
the elimination of the 1828 Tariffs of Abomination. Of course, Calhoun
and his political allies might have gambled that raising the stakes was the
only political ammunition left for South Carolina to evade the harms of the
detested policy. Indeed, after all the posturing, South Carolina immediately

ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS 127–28 (1935) (same); Karen E. Schnietz, The Institutional
Foundation of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, 12 J. POL. HIST. 417, 429, 432 (2000) (same).
56
See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 156–57 (describing Calhoun’s role in the Nullification Crisis).
57
JOHN C. CALHOUN, Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION
AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 313, 314 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992)
(“The courts cannot look in the motives of legislators. They are obliged to take acts by their titles and
professed objects, and if these be Constitutional, [courts] cannot interpose their power, however grossly
the acts may, in reality, violate the Constitution.”).
58
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA UPON THE SUBJECT OF
NULLIFICATION 15 (Boston, Beals, Homer & Co. 1832) (“[A]s the power to regulate commerce,
conferred expressly for its security, cannot be fairly exerted for its destruction, so neither can it be
perverted to the purpose of building up manufacturing establishments—an object entirely beyond the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government.”). Indeed, the key pronullification faction in South Carolina
was called the “States Rights and Free Trade Association.” See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 224.
59
CONFEDERATE CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
60
See SCHOEN, supra note 52, at 102–07.
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overturned the statute once the tariffs were reduced. 61 One might hope that,
given the intensity of the preferences of the pro-free trade coalitions in
South Carolina, there might have been ways to accommodate these
preferences outside the tactics adopted in 1832. Extreme political
brinkmanship certainly has its merits, but one hopes that it is only resorted
to when the stakes at issue are much more fundamental, and not simply the
kind of economic injuries that could be addressed by tweaking tariff
schedules.
In the end, the two dominant coalitions that descended on Philadelphia
in 1787 largely achieved their purpose in forging a new political order. The
institutional arrangement they put in place demolished the existing state
barriers to interstate trade and helped centralize foreign trade authority in a
national government. 62 This new regime succeeded in thwarting some of
the most destructive commercial policies among the states under the old
order despite the fact that it was a bargain by factions. 63 Thus, one cannot
assume that factions will tend to lobby for political institutions that will
harm the general welfare; on the contrary, they may spur the creation of
beneficial political institutions. But the Philadelphia experiment did not
take place without any glitches. For instance, the details of how the
national government would deploy its foreign trade authority were never
ironed out completely during the Convention. To be sure, the new
Constitution did not mandate the erection of new international trade
barriers to protect domestic industries. But by centralizing the tariff power
in the central government it made it easier to do so. And when protectionist
tariffs were subsequently established in the early years after the
Constitution was ratified, they provoked a strong reaction from Southern
farmers who were so dependent on free trade. The Nullification Crisis that
ensued in 1832 tested the limits of the Philadelphia bargain, but it by no
means undermined it. Ultimately, none of the relevant factions at
loggerheads during the Nullification Crisis concluded that it was worth
reverting back to the pre-1787 order.
B. Generating Spillover Benefits for Other Groups
Assuming that factions are self-interested and seek institutions to
provide them with private goods, might they generate spillover benefits for
other groups in society? The distributional approach to institutions may not

61
62
63

See FREEHLING, supra note 54, at 293–97.
See HARDIN, supra note 40, at 241–42; Bawn et al., supra note 41, at 579–980.
See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 40, at 242–43.
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sufficiently acknowledge the possibility of positive externalities from the
institutional choice of self-interested factions.
Political institutions have an inherently “public” quality that makes it
difficult for vested interests to capture the entire benefits of their favored
institutional initiatives to the exclusion of other groups. Or, to put it
differently, because political institutions tend to shape the outcome of
multiple policies, it is difficult to configure them as pure private goods
where parties can capture the entire social surplus. 64 Thus, compared to
normal legislation, which can often be tailored to provide very narrow
benefits to a vested interest, institutions are less susceptible to outright
exclusivity and rivalry—two of the hallmarks of traditional private goods.65
But that does not necessarily imply that all groups and citizens will benefit
equally from such institutions. On the contrary, some groups may benefit
from institutional arrangements, but others may be left worse off. The
existence of positive spillovers from an institutional arrangement to certain
groups may be contingent; in other words, even if it harms one group
today, it may benefit them in the future. But this latter kind of distributional
logic is not just an attribute of political institutions, but applies to a whole
other range of public goods as well.
A typical illustration of a positive spillover from institutional choice
can be gleaned from the contentious politics of federalism in the United
States during the mid-twentieth century. Southern segregationists from the
Jim Crow era might have pushed for an institutional regime of strong
states’ rights with the goal of achieving very specific sectional objectives.
Nonetheless, they could not subsequently exclude groups favoring gay
marriage from taking advantage of the same institution a couple of decades
later when they faced threats from a hostile national coalition.66 It does not

64
Of course, whether all institutional forms may yield spillover benefits to some groups is
questionable. One may be able to imagine a scenario where a faction may try to tailor an institutional
arrangement such that it is particularistic enough that it will yield only very narrow benefits to which it
may exclude other factions and citizens. For instance, it is plausible that a faction may favor
asymmetric federalism, in which states that favor its policy objectives have broad policy autonomy,
while the states that it dislikes are constrained by the national government. But this outcome is unlikely
for a variety of reasons. First, due to the very constraints inherent in factional bargaining, such an
asymmetric institutional arrangement is hardly ever going to be adopted. The factions that are
disfavored will simply not agree to the bargain. Second, factions tend to select institutional forms they
favor from preexisting institutional arrangements, or from slight alterations to those arrangements.
65
For an introductory discussion of public goods and the elements of exclusivity and rivalry, see
WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 694–95 (11th ed. 2012).
66
For instance, as commentators have noted, it was conservative interest groups that first tried to
expand the conflict over gay marriage to the national level. Donald P. Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion
as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s,
1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 5 (2001).
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matter that these two groups might not share complementary social or
economic objectives because the constraints or flexibility afforded by the
institutional arrangements could be exploited for both purposes.
Yet another illustration of a positive externality associated with a
regime of states’ rights comes from William Riker, who, in answer to the
question of whether federalism in the United States was worth preserving,
famously stated: “[I]f in the United States one approves of Southern white
racists, then one should approve of American federalism.” 67 But years later,
Riker would recant, in a way. Describing his own ideological shift from a
New Deal sympathizer in the 1950s to a small-government liberal in the
1980s, he averred that the civil rights legislation of the 1960s had altered
the political scene: “With the racial dimension of judgment . . . removed, it
became possible . . . to value federalism unambiguously as a deterrent to
statism . . . .” 68 Riker’s change of heart suggests that institutions that served
a morally questionable agenda for certain groups in one era might produce
other socially beneficial goals in another.
In any event, when factions seek to co-opt institutions for their benefit,
the relevant dynamic is not the one conventionally feared by public choice
theorists. Olson worried that interest groups often try to secure policy
outcomes in a manner that provides them specific benefits at the expense of
voters. 69 But at the level of factional support for institutions, Olson’s
insight could be turned on its head. In this picture, narrow factions push for
institutions that create spillover benefits for other groups, but they have no
mechanism to extract compensation from these free riders. Thus, the
dynamic is instead characterized by passive and unorganized groups who
benefit from the hard work and sweat of others, but have done little to
contribute to the institutional choice in the first place.
By extending the range of beneficiaries of a favored institutional
regime, however, factions may unleash a new range of political forces that
are vested in keeping the new regime in place. To be sure, there is no
mechanism for ensuring that such a self-reinforcing dynamic will persist;
indeed, the new institutional move may fizzle out because of lack of broad
support, or it may trigger a backlash that mobilizes opposition seeking to
undo it. But in many contexts, there are reasons to suppose that institutions
once created have a tendency to be relatively durable because changing
them will generate significant transition costs.

67
68
69

WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).
WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, at xiii (1987).
OLSON, supra note 4, at 111–31, 144.
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1. An Illustration: Trade Reform in 1934.—The passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 is a classic illustration
of how spillover benefits can be gained from institutional change favored
by self-interested factions. 70 The major institutional changes commonly
associated with the RTAA include: delegating trade authority from
Congress to the President; shifting from the supermajority requirement of
the treaty clause to the congressional executive agreements; adopting most
favored nations’ requirements in multilateral trade agreements;
implementing reciprocal reduction of tariffs; and linking together foreign
tariff negotiations with domestic tariff reductions in a single piece of
legislation with an up-or-down vote. 71 Together, these innovations have
been credited with ushering in an era of liberalization the likes of which
had not been known in American commercial history. 72
But within the Democratic Party, the Southern interests that
championed trade reform were likely less motivated by the ideology of free
markets than by a desire to secure access to foreign markets for cotton and
tobacco. As exporters of primary agricultural products to Europe, Southern
farmers often found themselves at loggerheads with protectionist industries
concentrated in the Northeast. 73 These latter interests had helped place
Republicans in the White House in twelve of the sixteen presidential
elections between the end of the Civil War and the onset of the New Deal.
During this period of Republican hegemony, Southern interests and other
export-oriented groups were largely thwarted in their efforts to secure low
tariffs. 74 With an ally in the White House in 1934, and majorities in both
houses of Congress, the Democratic commercial coalitions set about trying
to reshape the future institutional landscape of trade policy in their favor.

70

In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), Pub. L. No. 73-316,
§ 350(a), 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (2012)). The RTAA
authorized the President “[t]o enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments . . . and . . .
[t]o proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions . . . to carry out any
[such] trade agreement.” 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A)–(B).
71
See § 1351(a). For a broad analysis of these innovations, see Michael A. Bailey et al., The
Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WORLD
POL. 309, 311, 336–37 (1997).
72
KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEW LOOK AT US INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 40–43, 73–74 (2001); DESTLER, supra note 55, at 205–06; IRWIN, supra
note 55, at 220–22.
73
RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION,
1877–1900, at 125–28 (2000).
74
During the interwar years, the passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act (1930) and the Fordney–
McCumber Tariff Act (1922) ushered in a new era of aggressive protectionism by Republican-leaning
groups; indeed, Smoot–Hawley was largely credited with spawning a wave of tariff wars around the
world. See MICHAEL J. HISCOX, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & POLITICAL CONFLICT: COMMERCE,
COALITIONS, AND MOBILITY 60–61 (2002).
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The institutional reforms favored by these Democratic coalitions had
welfare and distributional consequences for both agrarian and industrial
groups, as well as consumers. The reforms improved the economic fortunes
of Southern agrarian interests, like tobacco and cotton, while also helping
specific industries that were export-oriented, such as aircraft, cameras, and
automobiles. 75 The reforms made certain commercial groups worse off,
however, such as heavily protected industries like mining, toymakers,
textile producers, and scientific instrument manufacturers. 76 But a key
spillover beneficiary of the reform was the unorganized consumer, who
gained from the lower prices on imported products. 77 Ironically, however,
although economists almost uniformly agree about the social benefits of
free trade, the verdict in popular surveys is less sanguine. 78 Thus, it is hard
to argue that the voting public demanded this state of affairs; on the
contrary, it might be better to describe this as a form of institutional
altruism that a faction imposed upon the public.
But a more interesting dynamic turns on the subsequent downstream
beneficiaries of the RTAA, especially those whom the proponents of the
reform did not intend to target. Initially, the reform was politically fragile
and might have been reversed if the political circumstances had favored the
Republicans in the early years following reform. For instance, the
Republican Party platform of 1936 not only vowed to repeal the RTAA, 79 it
also “condemn[ed] the secret negotiations of reciprocal trade treaties
without public hearing or legislative approval.” 80 For years prior to the
1940 election, the Republican leaders in the House and Senate
overwhelmingly voted for repeal of the RTAA every time it came up for
renewal. 81 By the late 1940s, however, when some of the Republican
business constituencies that initially supported repeal eventually became
75
Karen E. Schnietz, The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, 57 INT’L ORG. 213, 222, 227–28 (2003).
76
See id. at 218.
77
Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 10–11
(2009).
78
IRWIN, supra note 55, at 1 (“[F]ree trade does not win many popularity contests. Indeed, public
opinion surveys in the United States and Europe reveal increasing skepticism about the benefits of
international trade and trade agreements.”).
79
See Republican Party Platform of 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (2015),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29639#ixzz1RR7G6ga4 [http://perma.cc/PBZ6-LJ
A6] (“We will repeal the present Reciprocal Trade Agreement Law. It is futile and dangerous. Its effect
on agriculture and industry has been destructive. Its continuation would work to the detriment of the
wage earner and the farmer.”).
80
See id.
81
See Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing
Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 643, 644–45 (1999).
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net exporters, a split emerged among Republican legislators and many
decamped from their long-held protectionist positions to embrace free
trade. 82 This intracoalitional split within the Republican Party made it more
likely that the constitutional innovations that made the RTAA possible
would remain durable.
But buried in these developments lurks a political puzzle. It is
standard fare in discussions about international trade policy to assert that
protectionists have a clear advantage in overcoming collective action
problems because the benefits to such groups are concentrated, whereas the
costs to free trade groups are diffuse.83 In this picture, however, there are
export-oriented constituencies demanding that politicians seek free trade
policies, and these politicians responded by conveying concentrated
benefits on these groups. These concentrated benefits turned out not to be a
deadweight loss to society, but were actually socially efficient.
Additionally, it is not quite correct to suggest that groups favoring free
trade suffered from collective action problems at the time of the passage of
the RTAA. The pro-free trade Southern National Farmers Alliance was
considered “the largest citizen organization of nineteenth century
America.” 84 While this sector was not necessarily small in number, its
geographical concentration was high, and there is evidence that the benefits
from organizing were significant. Indeed, the political prowess of this
group and its offshoots were noteworthy, and it was credited for partially
spearheading the campaign to constitutionalize the income tax through the
Sixteenth Amendment, which had largely anti-tariff implications. 85
Southern, pro-free trade interests also played an outsized role in
influencing the political platforms of the national and state Democratic
Parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They also were
instrumental in securing the nomination of anti-tariff Democratic
presidential candidates, including Presidents Grover Cleveland and
82
See id. at 647 (“Senate Republicans voting in 1934 were responsive only to import-competing
interests, whereas those voting in 1945 were responsive to both import-competing and export-oriented
interests.”).
83
Indeed, the notion that protectionist groups enjoy a special advantage in capturing the
policymaking process is often put forth as a justification for the establishment of the World Trade
Organization. See Dongsheng Zang, Divided by Common Language: ‘Capture’ Theories in GATT/WTO
and the Communicative Impasse, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 424–27 (2009). For other
commentary on the capture theory, see DESTLER, supra note 55, at 14, which discusses how
protectionist interest groups capture Congress, and Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic
Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 182 (2007), which
states: “This cognitive factor tends to reinforce a protectionist proclivity in trade politics because it is
usually those well-organized interest groups that regularly patronize and thus capture politicians.”
84
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS 710 (David J. Wishart ed., 2004).
85
See Kimberly J. Morgan & Monica Prasad, The Origins of Tax Systems: A French–American
Comparison, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1350, 1362 (2009).
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Woodrow Wilson. 86 Indeed, President Cleveland’s first administration,
with its strong free trade platform, coincided with the return to dominance
of the Southern wing of the Democratic Party. 87 By contrast, when
Northern Democrats controlled the party from the Civil War through
Reconstruction, they were much more ambivalent and divided on the tariff
issue. 88
Other explanations of the RTAA that rely on the preferences of
individual institutional actors are unsatisfactory. Take, for instance, the oftrepeated claim that by delegating authority to the President, Congress
empowered an actor whose preferences were more free-trade-leaning than
that of Congress. 89 Setting aside the questions about the problematic
motivational and normative logic underpinning this argument, 90 it also
depicts a historically inaccurate picture. The delegation of trade authority to
the President in 1934 was actually not particularly novel; on the contrary, it
was largely imitating an institutional innovation established by Republican
protectionist groups in the late nineteenth century. 91 And prior to the
RTAA, people largely did not view delegation as a pro-liberalization
measure by free trade coalitions. For the most part, free trade Democrats
during that era tended to denounce delegation as an unconstitutional ploy
by protectionist Republicans. 92 Once the shoe was on the other foot,
86
See Kevin Narizny, Rational Idealism: The Political Economy of Internationalism in the United
States and Great Britain, 1870–1945, SECURITY STUD., Spring 2003, at 1, 9 (discussing the role
Southern Democrats played in Wilson’s electoral victory).
87
BENSEL, supra note 73, at 474 n.33.
88
See id. at 125 (“[I]n the industrial states of the East, the Democrats were much more restrained in
their opposition to the tariff; many of them even embraced protection.”). As a result of the compromise
of 1876, the Democratic Party had once again become a dominant political force in the South, and thus
began the southernization of the Democratic Party.
89
See DESTLER, supra note 55, at 15 (describing delegation to the President as an effort for
Congress to overcome one sided pressure of protectionist groups); Bailey et al., supra note 71, at 327
(observing that presidents favored low tariffs because the President’s constituency is national while that
of a member of Congress is local); Schnietz, supra note 55, at 429, 432 (same); see also David A. Lake,
The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-Hegemonic Era, 42 INT’L ORG. 33, 38 (1988)
(“[W]here the representative element of the state can be best understood as acting in the interests of
society, to use Pareto’s famous distinction, the executive acts in the interests for society.”).
90
See Bailey et al., supra note 71, at 313–14 (criticizing the lessons-learned approach); David H.
Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014) (criticizing the empirical and normative
claims made in favor of presidential primacy in foreign affairs); Nzelibe, supra note 11, at 1226–31
(same).
91
See Jide Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free Trade Constitution (2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (describing the use of delegation by Republicans in the nineteenth century to
achieve protectionist goals).
92
One of those critical Democrats was the young anti-tariff Representative Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.),
who, as Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, would embrace delegation as a device for rolling back
protectionism. See The Tariff Commission and the Flexible Tariff, in 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS,
at 399 (1929), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre
1929052900#.Ujy4aZzCa3o [http://perma.cc/KF7G-LREU]. For Cordell Hull’s more optimistic view of
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however, and the presidential electoral fortunes of the Democrats started to
change in the 1930s, they discovered the wisdom of delegation.
Republicans, on the other hand, had a change of heart in the opposite
direction. 93
The notion that the President is predisposed to free trade is empirically
suspect. On the contrary, it is more plausible to think that presidential
preferences on trade policy are largely shaped by conflict among partisan
coalitions. Historically, some of those coalitions have sought to delegate
authority because they favored lower tariffs, and sometimes they have
sought to delegate because they did not.94
In the end, the forces that drove trade reform under the RTAA were
not institutional actors operating autonomously or in opposition to special
interest groups. On the contrary, much of the credit for reform should be
given to the efforts of export-oriented groups of the 1930s, especially
Southern farmers. But these pro-reform coalitions were not likely
motivated by a high-minded desire to advance the general welfare. Their
intended objectives were much more mundane: they were seeking to
dismantle the system of tariffs that hurt their access to profitable markets in
Europe. But by pursuing their own private interests, they were able to
advance institutional arrangements that lowered tariffs domestically and
thus benefited the welfare of consumers in the United States.
C. Factions May Safeguard Against the Concentration of Authority
In much of the contemporary discourse about factions, there is an
implicit assumption that if one purges the influence of special interest
groups from the political scene, public officials will be able to diligently
pursue publicly minded objectives. But this logic of attaining political
benevolence by subtraction contains many problems. First, a politician who
listens exclusively to voters might not necessarily be motivated to do what
is in the “public interest” because voters might not necessarily be benignly

delegation when he was Secretary of State, see Judith H. Bello, Rising Tides: The Many-Faceted
Benefits of Global Trade Liberalization, 93 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 86, 87–88 (1999).
93
See Republican Party Platform of 1936, supra note 79.
94
To be clear, delegation to the President in the modern era may be more consistent with free trade
objectives. But that may be largely an artifact of the reality that modern presidents are prohibited by the
post-RTAA multilateral trade regime from raising tariffs unilaterally, although they have leeway to
reduce tariffs. This would be consistent with contemporary observations that the pro-free trade party
tends to favor delegation (regardless of the President), while the protectionist party tends to oppose
delegation (regardless of the President). See Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky & Phillip Y. Lipscy, Congressional
Preferences and the Structure of Delegation: Reassessing the Effect of Divided Government on U.S.
Trade Policy 4 (May 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1893289 [http://perma.cc/RAS3-KT5B]).
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motivated. 95 Setting aside the concerns of majority tyranny, the voters
might not necessarily be inclined to engage in disinterested judgments of
what the best policy might be, and more importantly, they might not be
motivated to have their representatives do so either.
Second, aside from voters and factions, there is also the problem that
the office holders themselves behave in self-interested ways that may
threaten institutional stability. One significant risk is that as suppliers of
public policies who also seek to extend their tenures on power, politicians
across the different branches of government might actually seek to pursue
power as an end in itself.96 In addition, some politicians may be tempted to
collude with each other, thus denying the voters any of the supposed
benefits of institutional competition that inhere in a system of checks and
balances. 97 While institutional self-aggrandizement by certain office
holders, such as the President, need not always result in bad policy
outcomes, it could lead to greater policy volatility across electoral cycles
and to an increase in the level of maximalist policies, which in turn may
increase political instability.
Factions, on the other hand, are more likely to act as policy
maximizers who tend to view political power largely as a means for
achieving other ideological or material objectives. The implication of this
dynamic is that factions may sometimes oppose the centralization or
accretion of power if they think it is likely to result in policy goals they
disfavor, regardless of which party happens to be in power. Therefore,
factions can play a role in overcoming collusion by forcing adversity across
institutional boundaries, even when officeholders might otherwise prefer
not to be in conflict. In this scenario, if members of Congress seek to
collude to enhance the power of a sitting president, they might find
95
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 191 (3d ed. 1950); see
also ANTHONY MCGANN, THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY: RECONCILING EQUALITY, DELIBERATION, AND
MINORITY PROTECTION 79 (2006) (“For democracy to have epistemic value, votes have to represent
considered judgments of what the correct policy is. However, political philosophers do not get to tell
voters how to use their votes.”).
96
As John C. Calhoun writes: “The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the
government, and thereby of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other
considerations, ample to divide . . . a community into two great hostile parties.” JOHN C. CALHOUN, A
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND SELECTIONS FROM THE DISCOURSE 14–15 (1953).
97
Indeed, one of the leading theoretical defenses of the separations of powers builds on the key
assumption that the various branches will not engage in collusion. Torsten Persson et al., Separation of
Powers and Political Accountability, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1163 (1997). But collusion between the political
branches is, of course, relatively common in American constitutional law. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (declaring unconstitutional legislation that provided the
President with line item veto power); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to
Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2231–32 (2012) (“Separation of powers controversies and
litigation most often involve collusion—agreement between putative institutional rivals in order to take
some constitutionally controversial government action.”).
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themselves facing the wrath of a policy-motivated faction whose interests
might not be advanced by such collusion.
Take, for instance, the perennial debates in the literature about war
powers. A prevailing concern in the American constitutional system is that
during periods of united government, Congress does not tend to check the
President in national security, and thus there is a greater risk that the
President will embark on military engagements without sufficient popular
support. Pildes and Levinson have argued, for instance, that judicial review
is most valuable during periods of united government where congressional
checks on presidential initiatives are weakest.98 While their prescription
builds on an acceptable empirical generalization about American politics,99
it is nonetheless incomplete. Sometimes, factions may decide to deploy
institutions strategically to constrain presidential flexibility when an issue
is owned by the political opposition, and increase flexibility on their own
issues, regardless of which coalition occupies the White House.100
Two examples illustrate how, due to factional pressures, members of
Congress opposed expansive war powers even during the presidency of a
copartisan, or encouraged more expansive war powers on behalf of the
President because of pressure from the political opposition.
1.

Conservative Opposition to Presidential Dominance in War
Powers: 1947–1960.—President Truman’s Cold War rearmament
policies and his decision to commit significant resources to defend South
Korea alarmed conservative-leaning groups during the early postwar era.101
98
See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2367–68 (2006).
99
See William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force,
59 INT’L ORG. 209, 215 (2005) (“If they take any public stand or introduce any substantive legislation,
copartisans in Congress are likely to demonstrate solidarity with their president, authorizing the use of
force or appropriating the funds needed to carry it out.”).
100
The analysis here builds on the “issue ownership” theory of partisan competition in which
parties try to shape the relevant issue agenda in a political contest in a way that favors those issues in
which they have an electoral advantage. As one prominent political scientist observed, “[P]arties do not
debate positions on a single issue, but try instead to make end runs around each other on different
issues.” William H. Riker, Introduction to AGENDA FORMATION 1, 4 (William H. Riker ed., 1993).
According to this framework, parties cultivate issue-specific reputations and are thus perceived by
voters as being more competent at resolving certain policy problems. For the most part, parties tend to
own those issues in which the electorate believes they have a special expertise. In the United States, for
instance, Democrats have cultivated a better reputation for handling social welfare and health issues,
whereas Republicans seem to have an electoral advantage in national security, drugs, and crime. As
such, each party has an incentive to focus their campaigns on those issues in which they are perceived
to have a leg up on the opposition. See John R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presidential
Campaigning, 1952–2000, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 601–02 (2003).
101
Truman’s Cold War strategy was encapsulated in the National Security Act of 1947, an
elaborate piece of legislation that was dubbed by a prominent Cold War historian “the Magna Carta of
the national security state.” MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1945–1954, at 24 (1998).

664

109:639 (2015)

In Praise of Faction

These conservative constituencies feared that unrestrained defense
spending would lead to higher inflation, economic controls, and other fiscal
policies that could harm their interests.102 Soon enough, disagreements over
policy spilled over into disputes about the constitutional allocation of
authority. That controversy came to a head in the aftermath of the Korean
War, when conservatives roundly criticized Truman for embarking on the
conflict without proper congressional authorization.103 But Democraticleaning constituencies were more sympathetic to the vision of a President
with more flexible authority and a greater assertive role in foreign affairs.104
In addition, there were intense disagreements over how the burden of
rearmament and war mobilization ought to be allocated, with conservative
constituencies sharply criticizing the huge tax burdens triggered by the
Korean War. 105
These disagreements had a much larger political dimension as well.
Specifically, conservative-leaning factions tended to depict Truman’s
vision of a national security state as complementary to an activist welfare
state, in which the occasion of mobilizing for war would be used to
consolidate the gains of the New Deal. 106 The possible symbiotic
relationship between the politics of guns and butter was not lost on Truman
or on Democratic-leaning constituencies, who actively promoted it.107
But the conservative antipathy to growing presidential power in
national security during the postwar era was not simply a case of partisan
aversion by Republicans to Truman’s presidency. On the contrary,
conservative resistance to the expansion of presidential foreign affairs
powers persisted throughout the 1950s, even after the Republicans won the
White House in 1953. Sometimes, their strategies for foiling the growth of
presidential authority included proposals for formal constitutional change,
such as the aborted Bricker Amendment of 1952–1953, which attempted to
weaken the President’s treaty powers. 108 Congress voted on this proposal,
which Republican senators overwhelmingly supported, during
Eisenhower’s presidency. Although Eisenhower expressed sympathy with
102
103

See id. at 9–10.
See Jide Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 874–75

(2013).
104

See HOGAN, supra note 101, at 5, 350–51.
See id. at 6.
106
Id. at 290–91.
107
See id. at 350–51.
108
See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988) (describing the Bricker Amendment controversy). For a
broader discussion of the debates surrounding the Bricker Amendment movement, see Nzelibe, supra
note 20.
105
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his copartisans about the dangers of using the treaty power to deal with
domestic issues, he sought to avoid the political pressure for an amendment
by committing not to sign any human rights treaty while he was in
power. 109
Sometimes, the strategies deployed by conservative groups were more
nuanced, such as trying to roll back the notion (endorsed by Truman) that
the President could act unilaterally in foreign affairs. Eisenhower often
obliged the more conservative wing of the Republican Party by distancing
himself from the constitutional and political vision of his predecessor.110
Facing pressures from his conservative flank to reduce taxes and defense
spending, for instance, Eisenhower slashed the defense budget, but several
members of Congress swiftly condemned him for endangering national
security. 111 When the question arose as to whether the United States would
intervene on France’s behalf in Indochina in 1954, Eisenhower reassured
reporters, “[T]here is going to be no involvement of America in war unless
it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to
declare it.” 112
While the pressures of the Cold War might have led to both a more
assertive role for President Eisenhower in foreign affairs and a more
acquiescent Congress, neither occurred. One cannot attribute reluctance on
Eisenhower’s part to popular sentiment. On the contrary, as Samuel
Huntington has shown elsewhere, popular public opinion during the
decades after the end of World War II tended to favor a more assertive role
of the American military and an increase in military expenditures. 113 One
might argue that Eisenhower’s experience as a former military officer
109
Secretary of State Dulles stated during congressional hearings:
[W]hile we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on
human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as
the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to
which this Nation has been dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to become a
party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate.
Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953).
110
See DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle
East, January 5, 1957, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER 1957, at 6, 11 (1958). (“Only with [congressional] cooperation can we give the
reassurance needed to deter aggression . . . .”); see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 116
(3d ed., rev. 2013) (“Eisenhower . . . came to realize it was a serious mistake, politically and
constitutionally, to commit the nation to war in Korea without congressional approval.”).
111
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL
POLITICS 234–43 (1961).
112
FISHER, supra note 110, at 104 (quoting DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, The President’s News
Conference of March 10, 1954, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1954, at 299, 306 (1960)).
113
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 111, at 236–43.
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cautioned against a more aggressive military role. That might be plausible,
except that the top military brass in his administration actually favored
increased defense expenditures,114 and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
favored military intervention in Vietnam in 1954.115 However, a more
plausible explanation is that a strong countervailing current of special
interests within his party stood to lose if a more dominant and intrusive
military role was asserted. At bottom, those factions promoted more active
constraints on presidential war powers during the height of the Cold War.
In sum, conservative factions in the post-World War II era tended to
associate greater presidential power with the threat of a creeping statism
that would be harmful to their core constituencies, regardless of the
occupant of the White House.
2.

Liberal Opposition to Repealing the War Powers Resolution:
1994–1997.—Starting with the fallout of the Vietnam War, the
politics of guns and butter took a sharp turn. Progressive Democrats
eventually abandoned their longstanding legacy from the 1950s as the war
party, and started to welcome greater congressional constraints on war
powers. When the Reagan Administration embraced fiscal policies that
made the tradeoff between guns and butter explicit, Republicans cemented
their modern reputation as the war party. 116 For many conservatives in the
post-Vietnam era, one particular institutional prize loomed large: repealing
the War Powers Resolution (WPR). Passed in 1973 over President Nixon’s
veto, the WPR provides certain procedures that the President has to comply
with before he introduces forces into foreign hostilities. 117 The WPR has
since been criticized by a variety of politicians for hampering the
President’s war making powers. 118

114

HOGAN, supra note 101, at 387–92.
JOHN P. BURKE & FRED I. GREENSTEIN, HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY: DECISIONS ON
VIETNAM, 1954 AND 1965, at 48–49 (1989).
116
Here, the assumption is that a state can invest heavily in either “guns” (i.e., defense), “butter”
(i.e., production of other social goods), or a combination of both. During the early portion of the New
Deal, investments in guns were considered complimentary to investments in butter, whereas after the
Vietnam War they became increasingly viewed as substitutes. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR
BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 535–37 (1996); Benjamin O. Fordham, The Evolution
of Republican and Democratic Positions on Cold War Military Spending: A Historical Puzzle, 31 SOC.
SCI. HIST. 603 (2007) (describing the Republican position as the war party); Nzelibe, supra note 103, at
870–71 (describing the Left’s guns and butter tradeoff).
117
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555–56 (1973).
118
For instance, Bob Dole introduced a bill called the Peace Powers Act of 1995, which in his
words would “untie the [P]resident’s hands in using American forces to defend American interests.”
Robert J. Dole, ‘We Will Continue in Our Drive to Return Power to Our States and Our People,’
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A10.
115
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During the Clinton Presidency, hawkish coalitions within the
Republican Party gambled on a “Nixon goes to China” logic; 119 in other
words, they calculated that their best opportunity to scrap the WPR was
when a Democrat was in the White House. The legislative vehicle for
repeal was a 1995 bill by Congressman Henry Hyde, an Illinois
Republican. In a speech on the House floor in support of Hyde’s bill,
House Speaker Newt Gingrich invoked the spirit of bipartisanship:
I rise for what some Members might find an unusual moment, an appeal to the
House to, at least on paper, increase the power of President Clinton. . . .
....
. . . . [T]he American nation needs to understand that as Speaker of the House
and as the chief spokesman in the House for the Republican party, I want to
strengthen the current Democratic president because he is the President of the
United States. 120

If he intended this appeal for his colleagues in the Democratic Party, it fell
on deaf ears. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) asked his colleagues to
repudiate the invitation because it “sends a signal that we abdicate our
power and give it to the President carte blanche.” 121 In a lopsided decision,
House Democrats voted 172–23 against the Amendment that would
ostensibly have increased the powers of their copartisan in the White
House. 122
D. Some Cautionary Notes About the Benefits of Faction
The analysis above has largely bracketed any discussion of the dark
side of factions in institutional design, and has instead focused on the sunny
side because such a perspective has been largely overlooked in the public
law literature. Such an approach is admittedly partial, but the goal here is to
provide a counterweight to the conventional hostility to factions rather than
engage in any comprehensive analysis.
Nonetheless, one might argue that the illustrations above have
depicted an overly benign picture of the influence of factions in shaping
119
As Robert Goodin has argued elsewhere in explaining the logic of the “Nixon goes to China”
effect, “If an action is somehow out of character for a particular politician, then, for that reason there are
fewer external obstacles to that politician’s performing it.” Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the
Looking Glass, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 420, 421 (1983). In this case, Newt Gingrich’s position would
have been likely criticized harshly as being overly partisan if he was seeking to expand the war powers
of a co-Republican in the White House. But such criticism would seem misplaced when he was pushing
to expand the presidential powers of a Democrat.
120
141 CONG. REC. H5672–73 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gingrich).
121
Katharine Q. Seelye, House Defeats Bid to Repeal ‘War Powers,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at
A11.
122
See id.
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institutions. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the net effect of this
influence is always going to be positive; on the contrary, tradeoffs are
involved. The level of enthusiasm associated with factions depends on
whether one thinks the expected benefits from institutional energy
outweigh the risks of having institutions that may be partially skewed in
favor of the most dominant factions. Indeed, even with some of the
illustrations above, one could plausibly argue that the role of factions might
have sometimes gone too far in one direction. Take, for instance, the
account given of the role of factions in opposing the expansion of
presidential war powers during the twentieth century. One could contend
that such opposition occasionally compromised the ability of the President
to react to both pressing security threats and humanitarian crisis or to
resolve an ongoing crisis in the most effective manner. 123 Whether one
thinks that state of affairs is good or bad may depend on one’s view of the
optimal balance between policy flexibility and constraints in national
security. But this paper does not purport to evaluate that balance. It merely
suggests that if one thinks constraining presidential flexibility in war
powers is sometimes important, one has to factor in the potentially positive
role of policy-seeking factions, and not simply rely on the empire building
ambitions of other institutional actors, such as members of Congress.
Finally, because promoting certain institutional values and certain
factional goals are not mutually exclusive endeavors, one ought to be more
circumspect about drawing sharp distinctions between factions that may
produce good institutional outcomes and those that do not. Take, for
instance, the distribution of factions that favored and opposed the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934. It might be that the Republican
protectionist groups who opposed reform and helped unleash the Smoot–
Hawley tariffs in the early part of the 1930s were in one sense
counterproductive, especially from the perspective of good trade policy.
But the same protectionist groups that dominated the American political
landscape for most of the early-to-mid twentieth century have sometimes
favored institutions that created significant spillover benefits for other
groups. For instance, for reasons that overlap with their pro-tariff leanings,
protectionist groups from the Northeast embraced institutional reform in
the mid-nineteenth century that most reasonable people would consider to
123
In his memoirs, for instance, Secretary of State Acheson not only argued that Truman’s actions
in Korea were constitutional, he also suggested that it was politically prudent for Truman to have
avoided a congressional resolution because the arduous process of doing so could have “shaken [the]
morale of the troops.” DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS AT THE STATE
DEPARTMENT 415 (1969). Moreover, he rebuffed the view that a congressional resolution would have
softened political criticism if the war became unpopular; after all, he insisted, “Congressional approval
did not soften or divert the antiwar critics of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt.” Id.
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be benign: the abolition of slavery. 124 As Rogowski observed, the
abolitionist support for protectionism was born of simple economic logic:
“Expanding trade, in the labor-scarce Americas, could only have depressed
wages; and such a development would in turn have intensified and
prolonged slavery.” 125
CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to defend the role of powerful factions in
both the design and maintenance of institutions in international and
constitutional law.
As long as groups have different capacities to mobilize politically,
those with superior political resources are likely to have an upper hand in
shaping the political rules of the game. But the role of special interest
politics in institutional design need not be pathological. On the contrary,
the prospect of private benefits going to certain groups may help spur them
to create institutions that also benefit unorganized interests. Of course, this
argument only suggests that a certain amount of factional self-interest in
institutional design is desirable. It also recognizes that the role of selfinterest and power may sometimes be excessive. On balance, the net
benefits of self-interested institutional design hinge on whether it is
difficult for factions to extract the entire social surplus from their preferred
political institutions to the exclusion of other groups.
But if contemporary political institutions exhibit a considerable degree
of nonexcludability and nonrivalry, then unorganized groups may gain
from those institutions even when they have contributed little to either
establishing or maintaining them. It is perhaps too strong to suggest that all
political institutions favored by narrow factions will yield spillover benefits
that exceed their social costs. But one may find some solace in the
likelihood that deeply asymmetric institutions tend not to have much
political staying power in the United States political system. While there
are understandably impulses to push the growth of the American state or
the executive branch in one direction, there are always counteracting forces

124

Indeed, some have suggested that protectionism was the key reason why certain groups opposed
slavery. See, e.g., Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of
Free Trade and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 181, 222 (1996) (“The
United States has worked to end this practice throughout the world since shortly after its own slavery
trade was abolished, though probably more for protectionist purposes than to accomplish any strong
moral cause.”). That perspective seems somewhat extreme. It is probably more likely that the goals of
seeking higher tariffs by northern industrialists happened to be complementary to the objective of
ending slavery.
125
RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: HOW TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC
POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS 166–67 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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who believe that bolstering a more powerful Congress or diffusing power
to the states will serve their interests. Ultimately, any political institution
that has significant redistributive consequences is prone to sustained attack
from those groups it disadvantages, and might eventually crumble or
become significantly revised either after multiple electoral cycles or when
new oppositional forces are mobilized.
At its core, however, the approach to institutional design endorsed
here is obviously nonideal. As a model of political behavior, it is one that is
marked by the dynamics of compromise and side-payments, the selfserving strategies and motives of transient interest groups, and sheer
political opportunism. Moreover, while it may inhibit the kinds of
maximalist policies that are favored by any one faction, it does not
guarantee that the political actors will gravitate towards the optimal set of
policies from a welfare perspective. At best, it may provide incentives for
politicians to avoid bad policies, and more often than not it may induce
them toward outcomes that may seem positively unexceptional.
Thus, unlike the bees in Bernard Mandeville’s famous fable or the
market in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 126 the “invisible hand” in a
model of self-interested institutional design may not necessarily point in
the direction of greater efficiency. Instead, it veers towards an objective
that is perhaps less rhetorically appealing but no less praiseworthy:
moderate institutional stability under a government bound by constraints.

126
See, e.g., BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES 67 (Phillip Harth ed., Penguin
Books 1970) (1724) (“Thus every Part was full of Vice, / Yet the whole Mass a Paradice.”); ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 130 (Laurence
Dickey ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. abridged ed. 1993) (1776) (“[H]e intends only his own gain, and
he is . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it.”).
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